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VIRGINIA'S LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN OVERVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The immunity of a sovereign and its agents from liability for tortious
conduct has long been a part of our common law.' Its origin seems to be
based on "the theory, allied with the divine right of kings, that 'the King
can do no wrong', together with the feeling that it was necessarily a contra-
diction of his sovereignty to allow him to be sued as of right in his own
courts."'2 More modern justifications include the desire to limit judicial
interference with the workings of government.' Naturally this desire has
left may wrongs unredressed. Thus, the law has been forced to accom-
modate two competing interests: (1) functional government unencum-
bered by the courts; and (2) the need of injured parties for judicial relief.
The purpose of this article is to examine this struggle within Virginia
where, as in many other states, the law has undergone change and evolu-
tion over the years. Focus will be on the immunity of state officers and
political subdivisions. As will be seen, the decision of a court whether to
grant immunity in a particular case involves a myriad of considerations,
including the character of the officer or subdivision seeking immunity and
the nature of the tortious conduct.
II. OFFICER AND AGENTS: IMMUNITY FOR STATE PERSONNEL
A. Negligent Acts
In Virginia the need to protect officers and agents of the state from civil
prosecution5 has been articulated in Sayers v. Bullar6 The defendants were
1. Sovereign immunity was first given expression by the Supreme Court in United States
v. M'Lemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 117 (1846).
2. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, at 970 (4th ed. 1971) thereinafter cited as
PROSSER]. Sovereign immunity rests on the "logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1970) (Holmes, J.).
3. This has been especially true when the plaintiff is seeking specific relief as opposed to
money damages. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949);
Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
4. See generally DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 25.00 to .18 (1976);
Eichner, A Century of Tort Immunities in Virginia, 4 U. RICH. L. REv. 238 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Eichner]; Harley and Wasinger, Governmental Immunity: Despotic Mantle or Crea-
ture of Necessity, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 12 (1976). Approximately twenty-seven states have
responded to the issue of sovereign immunity with some sort of legislative program. rd. at
33.
5. The complex process of legal administration requires that officers shall be charged
with the duty of making decisions, either of law or of fact, and acting in accordance
with their determinations. Public servants would be unduly hampered and intimidated
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employees of the Commonwealth engaged in laying pipeline from a state
owned spring to a state owned fish hatchery. Their activities caused dam-
age to a spring on plaintiff's adjacent land.7 The first issue before the court
was whether or not the defendants' conduct was imputed to the state. This
issue was resolved in the affirmative. 8
Having viewed the actions of the defendants as those of the state, the
court held liability was precluded by the theory of sovereign immunity. "A
state cannot be sued except by its permission, and even if the suit, in form,
be against the officers and agents of the state, yet if, in effect, it be against
the State, it is not maintainable." 9 This case, however, dealt with more
than just the right of a state to prohibit its capacity to be sued. The court
was also forced to consider the existence and scope of the immunity to be
extended by the state to individuals in their capacities as agents of the
state. 0 It was held that immunity should be extended whenever employees
were "acting legally within the scope of their employment."" Thus, relief
for plaintiff
would seem to require proof (and allegation) of some act done by the em-
ployee outside the scope of his authority, or some act within the scope of
authority but performed so negligently that it can be said that its negligent
performance takes him who did it outside the protection of his employment.
2
The implication of the words "so negligently," as demonstrated by the
subsequent case law, is that the liability of state employed individuals will
in the discharge of their duties, and an impossible burden would fall upon our agencies
of government if the immunity to private liability were not extended to some reasona-
ble degree.
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 975.
6. 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942).
7. Blasting within 30 feet of the plaintiffs property was necessary to lay the pipe through
limestone rock. Despite warnings from the plaintiff that such blasting would endanger his
spring, the defendants went ahead with the excavation. As a result, the plaintiffs spring
ceased to flow. Id. at 225, 22 S.E.2d at 10.
8. Gregory, J., writing for the majority quoted the opinion of the trial court as follows: "It
seems from the . . . declaration that all the facts complained of were committed by the
defendants as agents of the State and not as individuals in their own right and not of their
own independent volition .... If a wrong was committed it was committed by the State."
Id. at 229, 22 S.E.2d at 12.
9. Id. at 225, 22 S.E.2d at 10.
10. These were issues of first impression in Virginia.
11. 180 Va. at 230, 22 S.E.2d at 13.
12. Id. at 229, 22 S.E.2d at 12 (emphasis added). The court was quoting with approval from
the defendant's brief. The cursory repetition of similar limitations has had little restrictive
effect on the doctrine of sovereign immunity at the federal level. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 12:429430
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be abrogated unless a certain requisite degree of negligence can be proven
(assuming the act complained of is properly within the employee's scope
of authority). Moreover, this degree of negligence will vary widely from
case to case depending upon the nature of the acts involved. Generally, the
courts will require proof of simple negligence to find liability for injuries
resulting from the performance of ministerial tasks, while a greater degree
of negligence is required to find liability resulting from the performance of
discretionary tasks.'3
Although beset by certain definitional problems," the ministerial-
discretionary dichotomy is not without logical foundation. The distinction
is based upon a recognized need to limit judicial interference with the
administrative workings of government. This protection of certain official
activities is in turn based upon two fundamental principles. First, to con-
tinually submit state agents, especially those with discretionary authority,
to the constant threat of suit would surely hamper the provision of vital
governmental services to the public. Second, many government officers
build up an expertise over the years. The courts' own lack of knowledge
should preclude intervention since they would be less qualified than the
officer-expert to render a proper decision. In effect, judicial intervention
in the form of imposing liability upon state officers is a type of judicial
review of state administrative decisions, since it would often have the
effect of discontinuing a particular course of administrative action.
The rule that simple negligence may operate to bring ministerial activi-
13. See notes 19-24 infra, and accompanying text. While it is clear that simple negligence
will not support a claim against one with discretionary authority, it is unclear from present
case law how much more the plaintiff must prove in order to impose liability. In Lawhorne
v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973), the court seemed to indicate that a breach of
duty somewhere between simple and gross negligence would support a claim against state
officers charged with decision making. Unfortunately this middle ground has been left unde-
fined. Justice Cochran's dissent in Lawhorne addresses the problem created by the lack of a
definite standard:
[Tihe majority casts the nebulous shadow of a new gradation of negligence, greater
than ordinary negligence and sometimes perhaps less than gross negligence .... I not
only oppose any extension of the gross negligence rule into new areas of tort litigation
but I also disapprove as unwarranted the application of an intermediate degree of
negligence to employees whose employers are entitled to plead sovereign immunity.
214 Va. at 409, 200 S.E.2d at 573.
14. It is often difficult to determine whether a particular act is ministerial or discretionary.
In Virginia a ministerial act is defined as "one which a person performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done." Dovel v.
Bertrum, 184 Va. 19, 22, 34 S.E.2d 369, 370 (1945). See also Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538
F.2d 121 (1976). Yet, all acts necessarily involve some degree of discretion. See notes 25,-27
infra, and accompanying text; DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 26.02 (1976).
1978]
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ties of a state officer outside his scope of authority worked to abrogate
immunity for the defendant in Rives v. Bolling. ' Decided shortly before
Sayers, this case imposed liability upon a police officer who negligently
shot plaintiffs decedent while in the performance of official duty. The
defendant was twirling his service revolver on his finger while cleaning it;
it fired and killed a girl who was in the room at the time.
Although the defendant was required to maintain his service revolver in
a clean condition, thus making this activity within his scope of authority,'
the court held that the manner in which the activity was performed was
such that it brought the defendant from under the shield of immunity.
It was a negligent and improper performance of the officer's duty to twirl
a loaded revolver upon his finger ....
Negligence is of itself no part of official duty. Negligence may be the failure
to perform duty or the performance of duty in an unlawful or improper
manner. Official acts may be lawfully or unlawfully performed, dependent
upon their manner of performance."
By refusing to extend the state's immunity to the defendant in Rives,
the court underlined the notion that an extention of immunity, by its very
nature, differs in form and scope from its source. Thus, it is possible that
an officer or agent of the state may be liable for simple negligence in the
performance of ministerial tasks, while the state itself is not, even though
the negligence occurred within the officer's assigned duties.'8
Lawhorne v. Harlan,'9 however, held that state employees performing
discretionary functions were not liable for simple negligence. The case
15. 180 Va. 124, 21 S.E.2d 775 (1942). See also Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527
(1938), in which the court found the driver of a school bus liable for injuries to a child caused
by the defendant's negligent driving. The court held it to be "well settled that public officers
are liable for injury which is the result of their negligence in the performance of duties which
do not involve judgment or discretion in their performance but which are purely ministerial."
Id. at 595, 197 S.E. at 529.
16. As part of his regular responsibility, the defendant was required to keep his service
revolver clean. It was a task which "devolves upon the officer himself." 180 Va. at 130, 21
S.E.2d at 777. It is important to note that this task is ministerial in nature and that the court
required no more than a showing of simple negligence.
17. Id. at 130, 21 S.E.2d at 777.
18. See Crabbe v. County School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968), in which it was
held "that a state employee may be held liable for negligent conduct in the performance of
his duties, although the state itself is immune from liability by reason of such acts of its
employee." Id. at 359, 164 S.E.2d at 641. The court went on to point out that this bifurcation
is in accord with the majority of states. See 72 AM. JuR.2d States § 115 (1974); 81 C.J.S. States
§ 84 (1963).
19. 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973).
[Vol. 12:429
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concerned alleged improper diagnosis and care by state hospital adminis-
trators and a staff physician. 0
After briefly discussing the immunity of the hospital as a state agency,
2
1
the court went on as follows: "This immunity is also available to an em-
ployee of a state or one of its agencies who performs supervisory functions
or exercises discretionary judgment within the scope of his employment.
He will not be held liable for simple negligence, because his acts are the
acts of the Commonwealth." 2 The court found that the duties and respon-
sibilities of the defendants involved discretionary judgment of the type
that would absolve them of liability under the facts of this case. 3 The force
of this holding is that simple negligence in the performance of discretionary
tasks is not enough to take that performance outside the scope of authority
protected by the standard enunciated in Sayers.
2 4
As previously discussed, the "ministerial-discretionary" dichotomy is
not without logical purpose.2 5 However, it suffers from a major weakness
which often obviates any positive effect it might otherwise have. How is a
court to determine whether a particular activity in any given case is minis-
terial or discretionary? The question is an important one since it directly
affects the degree of negligence the plaintiff must prove in order to impose
20. The defendants were two hospital administrators and one surgical intern employed by
the University of Virginia Hospital. The plaintiff's decedent received a severe blow on the
head for which he was taken to the hospital's emergency room. He was released from the
hospital after his condition, a fractured skull, had been incorrectly diagnosed by the surgical
intern. After his condition worsened, decedent was brought back to the hospital where he
subsequently died, allegedly as the result of the improper diagnosis. Id.
21. Hospitals, which are organs of the state, enjoy immunity. Id. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 51.
Accord Maia's Adm'r v. Eastern State Hosp., 97 Va. 507, 34 S.E. 617 (1899).
22. 214 Va. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 571 (emphasis added).
23. For a discussion of the definitions of "ministerial" and "discretionary," see Semler v.
Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (1976).
24. The liability of employees of the University of Virginia Hospital has received extended
treatment in federal district court. In Nickell v. Westervelt, 354 F. Supp. 111 (W.D. Va. 1973),
a doctor on the staff of the university's hospital was granted immunity from his alleged
negligence. The plaintiff's decedent arrived at the hospital hemorrhaging from the nose and
mouth. The doctor was telephoned and on the basis of that communication decided that the
hospital's facilities were adequate to care for the plaintiff's decedent until he arrived seven
hours later. The court found this to be a "medical judgment" which it would not second guess
in the absence of "gross negligence." Id. at 114.
25. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
In Leathers v. Serrell, 376 F. Supp. 983 (W.D. Va. 1974), the defendant's motion to dismiss
on the grounds of sovereign immunity was refused. The defendant, a hospital-employed
intern, treated an individual who was not officially a hospital patient. Although this was a
discretionary judgment, the resulting injury occasioned the defendant's liability because he
was not empowered to make such judgments. Such a decision was outside the scope of his
authority as clearly delineated by statute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-276.7 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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liability. Moreover, it is difficult to answer. In Crabbe v. County School
Bd.,28 the defendant high school teacher was held liable for injuries to a
student caused by the negligent operation of an electric saw. This holding
seems to conflict with Lawhorne. Teaching certainly involves "supervisory
functions" and "discretionary judgment" as does the administration of a
hospital and the treatment of patients. Yet the court found liability in
Crabbe for simple negligence.
27
B. Intentional Torts
If liability can be placed upon state personnel for negligent conduct
under certain circumstances, it follows that liability will be imposed for
intentional torts. The leading case of Elder v. Holland18 supports this posi-
tion. Elder brought a defamation action against Holland for words he
repeated at a police hearing concerning Elder's character." Holland de-
murred claiming that since he was required by the state, as a police officer,
to testify, any damage inflicted by his words was inflicted by the state
2 0
The court gave a brief history of Virginia's sovereign immunity cases
noting that such immunity had some definite limitations: "Having con-
cluded that a State employee may be held liable for negligent conduct, we
must conclude that a State employee may be held liable for intentional
26. See note 18 supra.
27. This inconsistancy was observed by Cochran, J., in his dissent to the majority opinion
in Lawhorne:
In Crabbe we did not attempt to characterize [the teacher's] duties as either minis-
terial or discretionary. Indeed, the line between ministerial and discretionary functions
is not always clear, for it is difficult to conceive of any official act that does not admit
to some discretion in the manner of performance . . . .It would seem, however, that
the duties of the teacher in Crabbe were no less discretionary than the duties of [the
defendants in Lawhorne].
214 Va. at 408, 200 S.E.2d at 573.
28. 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967).
29. Both Elder and Holland were state police officers. Elder had been charged with impro-
perly receiving state funds to pad his expense account. While Holland was testifying at the
hearing, he was asked to repeat what had been said to him previously by one of the investiga-
tors concerning Elder. "Holland said (in part): 'We talked at some length ... and he made
this statement, he said: Jack Elder is a vicious, evil, common person. He does not believe in
God and you cannot do business with a man that doesn't believe in God, and you have no
business with such a man in your police department'." Id. at 16, 155 S.E.2d at 371.
30. The demurrer was not only based upon a claim of sovereign immunity, but also upon
privilege for statements made at a hearing. The court afforded Holland a qualified privilege
instead of an absolute privilege due to the informal nature of the police hearing. Id. at 22,




torts. Holland is, therefore, not immune from liability for defamatory
words spoken while performing his duties as a State police officer."
3'
C. Summary
The case law discussed thus far indicates that the Virginia Supreme
Court,32 although relatively traditional, is sometimes willing to grant relief
against individuals for tortious conduct even though such individuals are
agents or officers of the State. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
argue one or more of the following:
1. The defendant's actions were outside his scope of authority. The
plaintiff should bring to the attention of the court any statutory provisions
defining the limits of the defendant's power.
2. The negligence33 of defendant's actions brings him outside the pro-
tection of his authority. If the activity is ministerial in nature simple
negligence may be enough to meet the plaintiff's burden. However, if dis-
cretionary judgment is involved, the case law indicates that a greater de-
gree of negligence, perhaps gross negligence, must be shown.
3. The defendant's actions constitute an intentional tort. These are
necessarily issues of fact. However, they are issues the court must consider
before the merits are tried since the defendant will undoubtedly file a
demurrer.34
I. IMMUNITY FOR STATE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
A. Municipal Corporations
As stated earlier, the extension of sovereign immunity to state employees
and political subdivisions can best be analyzed as a function of the need
for government activity free from judicial interference balanced against the
31. 208 Va. at 19, 155 S.E.2d at 372.
32. Resort to a state court is not necessarily a plaintiff's only recourse. Certain conduct by
state officials subjects them to suit as individuals in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1974).
33. Note that negligence may take the form of either malfeasance or nonfeasance. Cf. Rives
v. Bolling, 180 Va. 124, 21 S.E.2d 775 (1942).
34. Sustaining the defendant's demurrer the court in Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 22
S.E.2d 9 (1942), said that:
There was no allegation that the defendants had stepped beyond the course of their
employment. There were no facts alleged . . . to show that they were guilty of any
wrongful conduct or acted wantonly or negligently. No facts were alleged to show that
they were acting individually and on their own responsibility.
Id. at 228, 22 S.E.2d at 12.
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need of injured parties for judicial relief. These competing needs have been
greatly felt when the courts are forced to deal with issues of immunity for
municipal corporations.3 5 The logical extension of attempts to accommo-
date these needs has been to bifurcate municipal activities, allowing suits
for wrongs committed in the performance of certain "proprietary" activi-
ties and denying liability for "governmental" functions.36
Virginia is in harmony with the vast majority of jurisdictions which
accept this position." Justice Hudgins, writing for the majority of the
Virginia Supreme Court in 1939,38 stated the general rule of law as follows:
[A] municipality is clothed with two-fold functions; one governmental, and
the other private or proprietary. In the performance of a governmental func-
tion, the municipality acts as an agency of the state to enable it to better
govern that portion of its people residing within its corporate limits. To this
end there is delegated to . . . a municipality . . . powers and duties to be
performed exclusively for the public. In the exercise of these powers, a munic-
ipal corporation is held to be exempt from liability for its failure to exercise
them or for the exercise of them in a negligent or improper manner.
There are granted to a municipal corporation, in its corporate and proprie-
tary character, privileges and powers to be exercised for its private advan-
tage. In the performance of these duties the general public may derive a
common benefit, but they are granted and assumed primarily for the benefit
of the corporation. For an injury resulting from negligence in their exercise
or performance, the municipality is liable in a civil action for damages as an
individual or private corporation.
3'
Thus reads the common law of Virginia. The difficulty lies not in the
statement of these basic principles of public policy, but in their application
to particular circumstances." In cases with unique factual settings, counsel
35. See generally Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YAL L. J. 1 (1924); Fuller
and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437 (1941); McQuILAN,
18 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 52.01-53.171 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
36. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 977-78.
37. Virginia's first acceptance of municipal corporate immunity couched in these terms
was in Richmond v. Long's Adm'rs, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 392 (1867). See also Jones v. Williams-
burg, 97 Va. 722, 34 S.E. 833 (1900).
38. Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939). The defendant was
charged with nonfeasance and misfeasance in the maintenance of a swimming resort (Shield's
Lake), when the plaintiff was injured by a barbed wire fence while swimming.
39. Id. at 147-48, 200 S.E. at 611. The supreme court reversed a lower court judgment
sustaining the defendant's demurrer based upon municipal immunity for performance of a
"governmental function" (i.e., maintaining and operating the swimming resort).
40. Those who appreciate the tautology that may be involved in such reasoning know
that lawyers and judges alike may be prone to decide first whether liability should be
imposed (a decision reached by considering such factors as the extent of the injury,
[Vol. 12:429
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would be wise to argue facts as they apply to his client's position and not
to spend time pressing rules of law which are settled to the point of being
case hard. Unique cases, then, must rely heavily upon policy not preced-
ent.
A discussion of the Virginia Supreme Court's treatment of all the factual
settings presented to it over the years is beyond the scope of this article.
However, it may be of value to mention certain cases which are representa-
tive of the type of factual situations with which the court must frequently
deal. For example, the court has been called upon more than once to rule
upon the issues of municipal immunity with respect to proper maintenance
of streets. Generally street maintenance is considered a "proprietary"
function (i.e., primarily for the benefit of the municipality as a corporation
rather than as an institution of government). As such, liability may be
imposed upon the municipality for negligence occurring during its street
maintenance operations,4 even though the public derives a common bene-
fit therefrom.
However, in Fenon v. City of Norfolk,42 a seemingly contrary result was
reached. Fenon, an infant, brought an action for injuries sustained when
the automobile in which he was riding struck a tree which had fallen into
a street during a storm. The storm, of hurricane proportion, 3 felled eight
hundred trees into the streets of Norfolk. Fenon alleged that the city was
under an obligation to keep the streets reasonably safe at all times, and
that it had negligently failed to do so. The city answered that street main-
tenance was a "governmental function" and therefore no liability for negli-
gence could be imposed. The court phrased the issue before it as such:
"Was the City performing a governmental function or a proprietary func-
tion in an effort to clear its streets on this occasion?""
The court relied on its earlier ruling in Ashbury v. City of Norfolk,45 in
which it held that removal of garbage by the city is a governmental func-
tion: "The difficulty [in cases of this kind] lies not in the statement of
the palpability of the neglect which occasioned it, whether the imposition of liability
would seriously hamper ordinary administration of the city's business, whether the
harm resulted from nonfeasance or misfeasance . . .) and then express their result by
classifying the function as governmental or proprietary.
Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. Rav. 41, 43 (1949).
41. Nobel v. City of Richmond, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 271 (1879).
42. 203 Va. 551, 125 S.E.2d 808 (1962).
43. Hurricane Donna struck the city on September 12, 1960.
44. 203 Va. at 553, 125 S.E.2d at 810 (emphasis added). Note the court's concern with the
facts of this particular case, as opposed to broadly applying the general rules of law enunci-
ated. See notes 35-39 supra, and accompanying text.
45. 152 Va. 278, 147 S.E. 223 (1929).
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the governing principles of law, but in their application to particular facts.
The underlying test is whether the act is for the common good of all
without the element of special corporate benefit, or pecuniary profit."4 It
was held in the principal case that if removal of rubbish from streets is
considered a "governmental function" then the removal of tree wreckage
during an emergency situation is a fortiori governmental.
Similarly it has been held that operating a police force 7 is a governmen-
tal function affording the municipality immunity from suit for negli-
gence. " However, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the applica-
tion of the rules of law on issues of municipal immunity is far from immut-
able. The amount of litigation in Virginia is not so extensive that most
cases will not present factual situations which are significantly unique in
some way. This is important because it allows counsel to argue persuasive
authority from other jurisdictions before the court. Since there is virtually
no consistency among the states on issues presented by any particular set
of facts, counsel should have little difficulty in finding some support for
his position.
The benefits of solidarity dictate that mention be made of the most
recent case before the Virginia Supreme Court on the issues of immunity
for municipal corporations. In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Hampton
Redevelopment & Housing Authority," VEPCO and the infant plaintiffs
below sought reversal of a lower court ruling dismissing any cause of action
against the Housing Authority. The infant plaintiffs, who resided in a
housing project owned and operated by the Housing Authority, were in-
jured when they came into contact with an electric "switch point box"
owned by VEPCO and placed on the project property. It was alleged that
both VEPCO and the Housing Authority were negligent in the mainte-
nance, installation and location of the box. The Housing Authority claimed
46. Id. at 288, 147 S.E. at 226 (quoting Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114
N.E. 722 (1917)).
47. Harman v. Lynchburg, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 37 (1880).
48. Although there seems to be no Virginia case in point, it is arguable that Virginia
municipalities will not be held liable even for intentional torts arising out of the operation of
a police force. Support for this position may be found in Bryant v. Mullins, 347 F. Supp. 1282
(W.D. Va. 1972). In that case, plaintiff brought an action against a police officer of the Town
of Coeburn under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974), for the unlawful and intentional assault and
battery of the plaintiff "with a large flashlight." The court first noted that under the Erie
Doctrine it was bound by Virginia law in its consideration of the substantive issues. It
continued, in dictum, as follows: "It is the opinion of this court that the Town of Coeburn,
in operating and maintaining its police force, was acting in a governmental capacity and is
not liable in tort for damages suffered by plaintiff in the alleged unlawful assault and battery
upon him by the town's police officer." Id. at 1284.
49. 217 Va. 30, 225 S.E.2d 364 (1976).
[Vol. 12:429
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that it was a political subdivision performing a "governmental function"
and was, therefore, immune from suit. The lower court agreed.
The Virginia Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of whether a
municipal housing authority (or any particular entity) should occupy the
same status with respect to tort immunity as the municipality itself. The
court, in making this determination, enunciated a two-part test: "first,
what attributes of a municipality the entity possesses; and, second, in light
of this initial consideration, the particular purpose for determining
whether a municipal corporation is present.
'5
The court held that a housing authority, brought into existence and
overseen by a municipality, should occupy the same status as the munici-
pality itself regarding tort immunity.
Thus, the second issue before the court was whether the placement of a
housing project by the Housing Authority is "governmental" or
"proprietary."'" In holding such function "proprietary" in nature, the court
reasoned as follows:
In operating and maintaining its housing project, the Authority assumes the
role ordinarily occupied by a private landlord . . .and performs functions
which could as well be performed by private enterprise .... The special
service performed by the Authority inures to the benefit of the few rather
than to "the common good of all."52
The lower court decision was reversed and remanded, the cause of action
having been reinstated against the Housing Authority.
B. Counties and School Boards
In Virginia, counties are considered part of state government, organized
to administer local governmental functions. As such, they enjoy the same
immunity from tort liability as does the state itself. This is the unchal-
lenged holding of Fry v. County of Albermarle.51 In that case, the plaintiff
was injured when her horse drawn buggy overturned on a county highway
as the result of coming into contact with a county chain gang then working
in the area. She claimed the county was liable for the negligence of the
chain gang members which caused her personal injuries.
50. 217 Va. at 33, 225 S.E.2d at 367. See also Hampton Rds. Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v.
Smith, 193 Va. 371, 68 S.E.2d 497 (1952).
51. 217 Va. at 34, 225 S.E.2d at 368. The court carefully pointed out that it was not ruling
on the categorization of other Housing Authority functions.
52. 217 Va. at 36, 225 S.E.2d at 369 (citations omitted).
53. 86 Va. 195, 9 S.E. 1004 (1890).
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The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the principles govern-
ing municipal immunity should also apply to counties:
[Counties] are local subdivisions of a state, created by the sovereign power
of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular solicitation,
consent, or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them. . . .A munici-
pal corporation proper is created mainly for the interest, advantage and
convenience of its locality and its people. A county organization is created
almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the state at large ....
We have been referred to numerous decisions concerning the character of
the duty required of [municipal] officials, drawing a distinction where the
duty is for the benefit of the general public and where it is for the benefit of
a corporation, but we do not cite them. They are more distinctly applicable
to municipal corporations proper than to such organizations as counties.54
Thus, when the courts' treatment of municipal immunity is compared
with that of county immunity, it becomes obvious that whether or not
sovereign immunity exists depends, at least in part, upon the character of
the political subdivision seeking immunity. "There is, of course, no logical
reason why a county should enjoy any more immunity than a city or
town."5 But such has been the consistent position of the Virginia courts. 5
Moreover, this position invites interesting contrasts concerning the ef-
fects of decisions rendered in accordance therewith. For example, it was
noted earlier 7 that municipalities may be held liable for negligent failure
to maintain their streets in a safe condition. But in Mann v. County
Board58 it was held that under the Virginia view "no liability is incurred
by a county for tortious personal injuries resulting from negligent construc-
tion, maintenance or operation of its streets, roads and highways."
59
Thus, similar injuries caused by similar public functions (e.g., street
maintenance) occasion different results in terms of governmental liability
depending upon the nature of the government institution involved. Justifi-
cation for such divergent results is said to rest on the theory that a county
occupies a different political position within the scheme of state govern-
ment than does a city or town. But neither this theoretical distinction nor
any pragmatic consideration seems to justify the resulting inconsistencies.
54. Id. at 199, 9 S.E. at 1006.
55. Eichner, supra note 4, at 258.
56. This seems to be contrary to the modem trend in most jurisdictions. For a comparison
of Virginia with other states in this area, see Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1079 (1951 & Supp. 1973).
57. Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 125 S.E.2d 808 (1962).
58. 199 Va. 169, 98 S.E.2d 515 (1957).
59. Id. at 174, 98 S.E.2d at 518.
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Like counties, Virginia school boards enjoy a rather wide and inflexible
immunity. The issue was first brought before the Virginia Supreme Court
in Kellam v. School Board."0 The plaintiff in that case was injured when
she slipped in the aisle of a school auditorium. She alleged that the aisle
had negligently been maintained in a "slick and slippery" condition. The
school board filed a demurrer which was sustained by the lower court. The
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that a school board is an
arm of the state and as such is immune from suit for tortious conduct. This
decision was followed some years later, but the court found an employee
co-defendant liable despite the board's immunity.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of sovereign immunity within the state of Virginia can best be
understood as an attempt by the courts to balance the benefits of judicially
unencumbered government administration against the detriments of al-
lowing wrongful conduct to go unremedied.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of this process is often impeded. The
courts, in an attempt to reconcile long-standing principles of sovereign
immunity with important modem policy considerations, have often been
very unpredictable. This unpredictability is almost inevitable due to the
many ambiguities surrounding the basic legal principles involved. The
ministerial-discretionary dichotomy with its varying degrees of negligence
is a prime example; as are the concepts of governmental and proprietary
functions applied to municipalities.
Many times a plaintiff is unsure not only of his chances for a successful
suit, but even of the grounds upon which his claim should be argued.
Moreover, a factual situation that might allow recovery against one type
of governmental defendant will prove unavailing against another type.
Thus, injured parties are often left with no remedy as the result of some
seemingly arbitrary judicial interpretation of key legal concepts, or be-
cause of some rigid categorization of the particular defendant involved.
In light of these impediments to the goals of sovereign immunity laws,
perhaps a legislative remedy is called for. Legislatively formulated defini-
tions of key legal concepts such as "ministerial" and "discretionary" would
tend to solidify the dynamic legal mass with which we must currently deal.
The legislature need not necessarily implement broad changes, sweeping
away proven legal principles, but it could easily curb the judiciary's purely
60. 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96 (1960).
61. Crabbe v. County School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E. 2d 639 (1968).
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case-by-case approach. While the value of the flexibility created through
case-by-case analysis is recognized, it is submitted that some flexibility
should be sacrificed to promote predictability. The ability to predict what
actions of government and its agents will give rise to liability can only
further the competing interests involved. Plaintiffs will benefit in that they
will not waste time and money pursuing valueless litigation. Governmental
administration and provision of public services will benefit because the
number of frivolous and unfounded suits will be reduced.
James A. Willett
